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Understanding Econo-Political Risks: Impact of sanctions on 
an automotive supply chain 
 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
We introduce econo-political risks (EPRs) to supply chains (SC). Based on case data 
from an automotive SC, this research identifies the mechanisms through which a subset 
of EPRs influences SC operations and outcomes. 
Approach 
An exploratory case study method is employed for theory development. Interviews with 
SC professionals of three case companies were the primary data source. Company 
documents, archival records, and direct observation provided further insights into how 
EPRs are perceived, how they impact a SC, how SC actors react to them, and what the 
overall performance results are. 
Findings 
The research identifies EPRs in terms of scope (flow of material, money, and 
knowledge) and time, and provides concrete examples, along with the channels through 
which their impact unfolds, and the responses available to SC actors. We find secondary 
impacts of EPRs through economic and regulatory channels to be significant, and 
bankruptcy, strategic reorientation, and single sourcing are common outcomes. By 
elaborating on the mechanisms through which sanctions impact upon supply chains, and 
the feasible response trajectories, this research can assist SC actors with more effective 
management of EPRs.  
Originality 
This paper is novel for three reasons: first, it introduces EPRs to research into supply 
chain risk management (SCRM); second, it addresses SC risks in a developing country, 
a topic largely missing from the literature; and finally, this research focuses on post-
event SC risks, whereas the bulk of SCRM literature focuses on the pre-event phase. 
Keywords: supply chain management; risk management; disruption; economic risk; 
political risk; causal diagramming; sanctions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Focusing on developed countries, much research on supply chains (SCs) ignores 
uncertainties in the political climate due to their secondary importance to the operation 
of SCs. In practice, uncertainties such as potential restrictions on trade and financial 
transactions are central to the concerns of many SC managers in developing countries. 
For example, over recent decades thousands of firms in countries across different 
continents, such as Burma, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, and Sudan, 
have been exposed to significant restrictions due to international and unilateral 
sanctions. Other firms in countries exposed to civil unrest, drug cartel wars, and 
insurgencies also have to cope with similar uncertainties.  
1.1 Problem Definition  
We define econo-political risks (EPRs) to SCs as the uncertainty in access to trade 
routes, partners, knowledge, and financial transactions due to political and economic 
factors outside the control of the SC members. Besides the directly affected SC 
members, understanding these risks is of interest to the trade partners of these 
companies located in other regions. In this paper we elaborate on sanctions, a subset of 
EPRs and our research focuses on SCs positioned within a sanctioned country. These 
sanctions are usually imposed on developing countries by sanctioning countries and 
international bodies in order to achieve a behaviour change in the political or social 
domain by the sanctioned government.  
We use a case study to develop theory around sanctions as an EPR. The case country is 
a developing country that has faced different levels of sanctions for over three decades. 
The case study is a car manufacturing SC with different entities, including the 
manufacturer, a fourth party logistics provider (4PL) and suppliers. The research is 
based on primary and secondary data: primary data were collected through interviews 
and observations, and archival documents were used as secondary data sources. 
1.2 Motivation 
The perceived success of sanction regimes as assessed by sanctioning countries and 
bodies such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the U.S. 
government partly depends on the lack of ability on the part of the SCs in sanctioned 
country to adjust to these policies. Therefore, understanding the impact of EPRs on SCs 
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is of interest to many players at both the firm and country level. Number of sanctioned 
countries in Asia, Africa, Latin and South America, and Europe over recent decades 
includes many dozens and is more than many would perceive (Eyler, 2007); 
consequently, this is not a rare risk. Moreover, some of these countries are emerging 
economic powers, which play very important roles in global SCs crossing many 
boundaries. Therefore, there is a large group of stakeholders who are globally impacted 
by such sanctions.  
Furthermore, research on the impacts of sanctions has so far been limited to the 
macroeconomic outcomes, and there is little research looking at the level of SCs. The 
SC level research is needed for building the micro-foundations of macro research on 
sanctions. More specifically, there has been some research on economic aspects of 
sanctions in developing nations but impact of sanction on SCs has not been studied in 
any detail.  
Finally, sanctions can be considered as a cause of SC disruption; yet they are 
qualitatively different from better-researched types of natural and man-made SC 
disruptions and therefore require separate analysis. Common disasters occur 
spontaneously and often with little pre-warning, in contrast, precursors to sanctions are 
observable by SC members long before they are implemented. Moreover, typical 
disasters are outside of SC members’ control; however, the course and severity of 
sanctions could theoretically be influenced by SC members, e.g. through lobbying 
activities. Third, natural disasters unfold over a brief time period, while sanctions unfold 
very slowly. Finally, the impact of typical disasters includes injuries, fatalities, and 
damage to physical assets, whereas sanctions typically activate very different impact 
mechanisms.  
1.3 Contributions 
In addition to identifying and elaborating on a distinct type of risk not previously 
examined within SC literature, this research has additional features that distinguish its 
contribution to SC risk management (SCRM) literature. 
Although SC risk management itself is not a very new research topic in the literature, 
this paper emphasizes the risks due to political developments, which is less studied. In 
addition, this research uses data from a developing country, not a common empirical 
context in the published literature despite the growing volume of global economic 
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activity that originates from the developing world. In fact, most of the previous research 
investigate the uncertainties from the perspective of SCs located in developed countries 
and may miss important risks faced by a large fraction of global economic actors. The 
current paper builds on empirical data collected from members of a SC in a developing 
country. Finally, many research papers over SC risk management comprise pre-event 
effects but this research focuses mostly on post-event effects including short-term, mid-
term and long-term effects. 
1.4 Research Questions 
In this paper we focus on understanding the impact of sanctions on SCs. Noting the 
limited prior research on the topic, we focus on building a better theoretical 
understanding of EPRs and their corresponding impact mechanisms. We limit our focus 
to SCs that are not directly the target of sanctions, e.g. our study would not apply to the 
nuclear industry in a country sanctioned due to a suspected nuclear weapons 
programme. This is due both to security concerns and the complexities that arise from 
gaming between political actors, which are not relevant to a typical SC.  
We focus on the following novel research questions: 
 What are the mechanisms through which econo-political sanctions impact SCs 
within a targeted country both in the short and the long term? 
 What mitigation strategies are followed by SC members in a sanctioned country 
to deal with the risks imposed by sanctions?  
 How does the interaction between these risks and mitigation strategies influence 
SC operation and performance and how do these influences depend on the 
position of SC members?  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature on sanctions is in the field of political science and focuses on the 
country as the unit of analysis, thereby not examining the impact of sanctions from the 
operations management perspective. Nevertheless, this literature provides basic 
background and definitions pertinent to the current research. A different field of 
literature in SCRM provides further context and poses analytical questions that we bring 
into the study of the impact of sanctions on SCs. 
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2.1 Econo-Political Sanctions 
Sanctions include limitations on activities of one or several countries imposed by 
international players, such as the EU, UN and the U.S. government. These limitations 
deprive the target country/countries from specific types of transactions. The sanctioning 
countries and international bodies typically pursue this course to oblige the target 
country to accept some conditions of the imposing country/body (Eyler, 2007). 
Depending on the type of transactions they target, sanctions can be divided into 
categories such as military, economic, international, and political, although some 
sanctions may fall into more than one category (Charnovitz, 2001; Eyler, 2007; William 
and Anton, 2003). The post-World War II history has witnessed many instances of 
sanctions targeting diverse countries, from Argentina and Brazil, to China, Cuba, India, 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Turkey and many others. In fact, more than half the 
population of the world has experienced some form of sanctions during this period 
(Eyler, 2007). This research focuses on econo-political sanctions where the target 
country is subject to business and financial restrictions, which limit its access to 
international markets and enterprises. There has been some research on the economic 
impacts of sanctions in developing nations (Askari et al., 2003; Eyler, 2007) but they 
have not looked at the impact of sanctions on SCs. Eyler (2007) investigated sixty five 
episodes of sanctions to estimate the effectiveness of such policies (countries and the 
sanction period are exhibited in Table 1). Some of these sanctions are still running and 
some have been imposed on large economies like China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia 
potentially affecting other SCs in countries not directly targetted by sanctions. 
Table 1- Summary of the empirical analysis of economic sanctions by Eyler (2007) 
Scope: Macroeconomic aspects of international 
economic sanctions 
Main theories for data analysis: Game theory, 
and public choice theory 
Method: Empirical investigation of sixty five 
cases to estimate the economic, humanitarian and 
political effectiveness of such policies. 
Main recommendation: Sanctions are 
macroeconomic phenomena that should be 
analysed similar to monetary and fiscal policies.  
Investigated sanction cases: 
Argentina (1977–84), Brazil (1962–64, 1977–84), Cameroon (1992–98), Chile (1965–66; 1970–90), 
China (1989–98), Colombia (1996–98), Cuba (1960–Present), El Salvador (1977–81; 1987–88; 1990–
93), Ethiopia (1976–92), Guatemala (1977–86; 1990–93), Haiti (1987–90; 1991–94), India (1965–67; 
1978–82; 1998–99), Indonesia (1963–66; 1993–95), Iran (1979–81; 1984–Present), Iraq (1980–87; 
1990–2003), Libya (1978–Present), Malawi (1992–94), Myanmar (1988–90), Nicaragua (1977–79; 
1981–88; 1992–95), Nigeria (1993–98), North Korea (1950-Present), Pakistan (1971–72; 1979–90), 
Panama (1987–90), Paraguay (1977–81; 1996–98), Peru (1968–74; 1995–98), South Africa (1975–82; 
1985–92), South Korea (1973–77), Sri Lanka (1961–65), The Sudan (1989–Present), Syria (1986–94), 
Taiwan (1976), The Gambia (1994–98), Thailand (1990–93), Turkey (1974–78), Uruguay (1976–81), 
USSR (1975–83), and Zimbabwe (1983–88) 
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2.2 Supply Chain Risk 
Exogenous events can expose a SC to significant risks. In SCRM literature, disruption is 
defined as a group of risks rooted in some external factor, such as natural disasters, 
labour disputes, supplier bankruptcy, acts of war and terrorism (Chopra and Meindl, 
2007). Disruption risks generally have a low probability of occurrence but a high 
potential for great loss (Davarzani et al., 2011). Recently, this research domain has been 
growing and specialised categories, such as humanitarian logistics in the face of natural 
disruptions, have emerged (Kovács and Spens, 2007). Many examples of disruptions are 
discussed within this literature, including the impact of labour strikes and earthquakes 
on automobile SCs (Kim and Reynolds, 2011), electronics SCs disrupted by fire 
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004), Hurricane Mitch’s impact on banana plantations, and the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks influence on auto manufacturing in the US (Martha 
and Subbakrishna, 2002; Monahan et al., 2003) among others.  
Research on SC risk and uncertainty management has been growing over the past 
decade, partly due to the occurrence of major disruptive events such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes and economic crises. Furthermore, the influence of these events has been 
magnified as a result of global SCs, which have increasingly alerted researchers and SC 
managers to the importance of managing these risks. Several models and strategies have 
been developed for managing SC risks (Hoffman, 2002; Juttner, 2005; Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005; Norrman and Lindorth, 2005; Tang, 2006; Mehari, 2007; Paulsson, 2007). 
These models typically focus on designing risk identification, assessment and 
mitigation, and taking proactive actions are recommended to mitigate many of these 
risks (Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Knemeyer et al., 2009).  
Research on managing risks has been typically analytical (Harland et al., 2003; Levary, 
2007; Paulsson, 2007; Knemeyer et al., 2009), for example focusing on stylised models 
of risk management within a buyer-seller relationship (a dyad) and the whole SC (Sinha 
et al., 2004); however, there are fewer studies on the real world implementation of these 
models (for exceptions see: Finch, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Mullai, 2005).  
Despite their growing role in the global economy, the state of research and practice on 
SCRM is less advanced when it comes to developing countries. Data availability and 
researcher access has limited research focused on these settings. In addition, poor 
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management capability and planning processes have also limited SCRM practice in 
these countries (Blos et al., 2009). 
This paper focuses on sanctions, a SC disruption risk that originates from international 
political developments beyond the control of a focal firm. Research on the impact of 
sanctions on SCs is very limited and a major reason for this is the complexities involved 
in accessing relevant data. Access to SCs in countries targeted by sanctions is often 
limited due to travel restrictions and researcher security concerns. Therefore prior 
research has not used detailed observations, interviews, or other direct sources of data to 
elaborate upon the mechanisms and dimensions of sanction risk. In this research we 
build on a unique opportunity to conduct a detailed case study within a large automotive 
SC located in a country facing increasing international sanctions. This allows us to 
assess how in practice SC managers perceive, prioritise and react to EPRs.  
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research uses an exploratory case study method (Eisenhardt, 1989) to develop 
theory about the impact of sanctions on SCs and the responses of SC actors to this risk. 
The choice of method is informed by two considerations; first, in the absence of 
previous research there is a salient need for developing theory on the basic concepts, 
mechanisms, and variables that are relevant in this problem context and such a 
theoretical foundation is required for future analytical modelling or empirical testing. 
Second, a case study is used for theory development both because of the nuanced and 
multi-dimensional data that it provides through interviews, observations, and archival 
documents, and because the amount of quantitative data available in this setting does 
not warrant a data-driven quantitative approach to theory development.  
3.1 Overview of the Case Companies 
The scope of the study covers three members of a SC within the automotive industry, 
including the main manufacturing company, the only 4PL provider of the focal 
company responsible for providing parts, and the main supplier of engines, axels and 
gearboxes. These companies will be termed the ‘manufacturer’, ‘4PL’ and ‘supplier’ 
hereafter. Table 2 provides a brief overview. 
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Table 2- Case supply chain characteristics 
Studied 
companies 
Manufacturer 4PL Supplier 
No. of Employees Roughly 25,000 1652 Roughly 4,000 
Date of launch 1962 1994 1993 
Responsibilities Assembly and 
manufacturing 
Design engineering, 
purchasing and supplying of 
automotive parts 
Supplier of engines, 
axels and gearboxes 
 
This case represents the largest automotive manufacturer in the Middle East. The 
manufacturer’s main production sites and market are domestic but it has expanded by 
launching production and export sites in Africa, China and South America, as well as 
broadening its export market. During the two decades preceding 2011, the focal 
company has experienced an average annual growth rate of 20% and as a result the 
number of its domestic suppliers has increased from 126 in 1993 to 559 in 2011. 
Although the localisation attempts and the growth of the product portfolio have caused a 
significant jump from 103 domestically procured parts to 4,500, the company has also 
tried to expand its international relationships and in 2011 it had cooperative 
relationships with 264 international companies, mainly situated in France and Germany. 
Among the global members of the chain, approximately 40 supply parts and the 
remainder procure licensing, technology and equipment.  
3.2 Primary and Secondary Data 
Semi-structured and open-ended interviews were conducted with SC professionals of 
the three studied companies in order to understand the current and past state of the 
companies, the impact of sanctions, and the responses taken by the companies. 
Company documents, archival data, and direct observations were employed as 
secondary data sources. Each of these data sources was used in different stages of the 
research and their uses are illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3- Summary of the data and their sources 
Data 
Collection 
Mode 
Total No. of Participants  
(and no. of sessions per group and the year) 
Average 
Length of 
Interviews 
No. of companies 
Focus of Data 
Collection 
Individual 
Interview 
Manufacturer: Strategic planning vice president (Sep 2007) and 
3 managers below him related to risk (Sep 2007, April 2010) , 
finance (April 2010) and SC (April 2010) 
4PL: manager of foreign procurement (2010), manager of local 
procurement (2010), manager of engine group (2007, 2010), 
manager of procurement planning (2010), manager of planning 
division (2008, 2010), manager of commercial division (2010), 
risks analyst (2007, 2008, 2010), manager of localisation (2007, 
2008), manager of supplier logistics (2008, 2009), manager of 
production and localisation (2007, 2008) 
Supplier*: commercial deputies (2010, on two occasions) 
2 hours 3 (manufacturer, 
4PL, supplier) 
Risks 
identification, 
mitigation and 
recovery actions, 
mechanisms of 
impact 
Group 
Session and 
Group 
Meetings 
Usually 8-12 persons but the minimum no. of participants was 4. 
Total no. of sessions: 9 (4PL: 8 and supplier: 1) 
For 4PL, different participants in each session but a subset of the 
following positions: CEO, head of the 6 main deputies (planning, 
commercial, financial, quality, manufacturing, technical and 
engineering divisions),employees in procurement division, 
manager of procurement planning, risks analysts, manager of 
localisation, manager of supplier logistics 
For supplier, participants were the head of 5 deputies 
(commerce, finance, quality, R&D, technical engineering) as 
well as the CEO. 
2 hours 2 (4PL, supplier) Mitigation and 
recovery actions, 
sources of risks, 
inter-relations of 
risks, mechanisms 
of impact 
Archival 
Data from 
Companies 
Gradually over 4 years: 
more than 1300 pages 
- 2 (manufacturer, 
4PL) 
Price of parts, 
sources and their 
problems, sourcing 
process 
Archival 
Data from 
Industry 
Publications 
Gradually over 4 years - 1 (4PL) Background of the 
risk management 
activities in the 
companies 
Companies’ 
Websites 
and 
Publications 
Gradually over 4 years - 3 (manufacturer, 
4PL, supplier) 
Companies’ 
backgrounds and 
activities 
* In addition to the mentioned number of sessions there were 4 additional sessions (with 3 procurement employees and the head of 
the finance deputy) in which the interviewees did not provide data that was substantively relevant to our topic and thus were 
excluded.  
 
The interview subjects were chosen to provide a breadth of knowledge on the research 
topic (Yin, 2003). Table 3 provides a summary of the different data items collected and 
their sources. The companies were aware of the research topic and supportive of it due 
to their major concern regarding risk management in the face of sanctions. Open 
interviews with three high-ranking executives of the investigated companies were 
conducted to establish the research scope and focus. Furthermore, thirteen executives 
and seven of their direct reporting employees were interviewed using a semi-structured 
interview protocol (see Appendix A) with the goal of identifying different types of 
EPRs due to sanctions and the firms’ responses. These interviewees covered the 
 10 
 
relevant decision makers in the SC when it came to assessing the risks and responding 
to sanctions. Four of the managers were interviewed as a group because of their 
complementary knowledge on different aspects of the risks. In total, 31 individuals were 
interviewed with some informants being interviewed more than once. Four individuals 
have been excluded from Table 3 since the interviews demonstrated that they were 
insufficiently informed about the research topic. Interview questions were focused on 
EPRs, so interviewees needed to have specialized knowledge about the topics in the 
meeting. Note that, all the key informants of the studied companies were interviewed 
either individually or in focus group sessions. A summary of each interview was shared 
with the interviewees for edits and confirmation of accuracy.  
In addition to the individual interviews, nine focus group sessions were organised to 
gather the required data on mitigation and recovery actions, sources of risks, inter-
relations of risks, and mechanisms of risk impacts. Furthermore, data was collected 
from current documents published by the organisations, including demand, price list, 
and the quality cost of some of the internationally sourced parts. Figure 1 summarises 
the research steps and related data gathering efforts. More elaboration on the data 
analysis method is given in Appendix B.  
 
Figure 1- Research steps and the data sources for each step 
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The research lasted for four years and as a result different individuals occupying the 
same roles were interviewed in a few instances and this led to additional insights into 
the impact of variations across individuals on risk assessment and responses. Because of 
the longitudinal impacts of sanctions we needed to study the case for a long time 
horizon to be able to capture important impacts and solutions spanning a few years. 
The data collection and analysis process follows a qualitative research method, draws 
upon different sources, and spans multiple years. These factors increase the need for a 
rigorous research process to ensure that the findings are reliable. Several steps were 
taken to address this issue, multiple criteria were explicitly considered to enhance the 
rigor of qualitative case studies (Mollenkopf et al., 2007; Lin and Zhou, 2011) and 
applied in the design and implementation of the research. These criteria and the specific 
actions related to them are summarised in Appendix C. 
4. DEVELOPING THE THEORY ON THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
A theory on risks of sanctions on SCs is developed in the following steps. First, an 
organising framework of risk management is offered, which informs the relevant 
components that should be addressed in our theory. Taxonomy of EPRs and a map of 
the typical menu of responses at the disposal of affected SCs are then provided. These 
components are substantiated by mapping out the risks faced and the responses adopted 
in the case studies, along with their impacts on the overall SC.  
Sanctions are a prime example of EPRs. Firms in a targeted country may be affected 
through multiple channels, but the exact pathways, the extent and the duration of the 
impact are unknown. These uncertainties are a major concern and firms may need to 
plan for alternative contingencies that may unfold. In fact, the uncertainty is potentially 
higher in industries that are not a direct target of sanctions. In these cases, many 
unforeseen effects of sanctions are likely to catch managers by surprise, significantly 
increasing the risks these managers face. As a result, we draw upon SCRM as the 
underlying theory to organise our concepts. 
SCRM literature offers several different risk management frameworks (Harland et al., 
2003; Sinha et al., 2004; Juttner, 2005; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Knemeyer et al., 
2009). While they differ in details, three steps concerned with risk identification, 
analysis, and planning/implementation are shared across these frameworks. Moreover, 
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risk management is a continuous process that is maturated over time (Finch, 2004; 
Norrman and Jansson, 2004); therefore we conceptualise this process as a three-step 
cycle (Figure 2), which needs to be customised based on sub-steps for different groups 
of risks or business types. Analysis and planning for the management of operational 
risks are inherently different from disruptions, and within each of these groups of risks 
every single type of risk calls for tailored actions. 
Through our first phase of interviews and the review of the literature, we identified the 
scope of the risk, its timeline, and its impact type as useful dimensions for organising 
EPRs. The scope of risk captures which of the central flows in a SC, i.e. money, 
information and material, can suffer from a risk item. While much of the disruptions 
discussed in the literature focus on material flow, EPRs can also significantly impact on 
money and information flows. Impact type signifies the specific operations that are 
impacted by a risk item. Furthermore, in contrast to typical natural disruptions that 
unfold quickly, EPRs unfold slowly and therefore their timeline is a distinct factor to be 
considered. We categorise EPRs’ impacts into short term and long term, where the 
former appear within one year after imposing new sanctions and long-term 
consequences are revealed over a longer time period. 
 
 
 
Figure 2- Theoretical framework to manage econo-political risks 
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In response to perceived risks the SC actors may react at different levels, operational, 
tactical, and strategic. Operational responses address an immediate problem, tactical 
responses are taken to adjust SC operations in line with the medium term repercussions 
of the risk, and strategic changes will be considered if operational and tactical steps 
cannot solve the long term problems caused by EPRs. For example, in June 2010 the 
4PL company suddenly faced a sanction-motivated prolonged inspection time in the 
Netherlands for a part that was sourced from there. It had been planned to transport the 
cargo to the destination by sea and the increased lead-time could have caused significant 
production delays. The immediate operational response was to transport a batch of 
products by plane at a significant shipment cost. This operational activity triggered a 
tactical change to the production schedule and the company used for shipment. 
Repetition of such problems can initiate adjustments in sourcing strategies, for example 
seeking alternative sources from a different country or continent.  
4.1 Taxonomy of Econo-Political Risks 
EPRs have a widespread impact on business. Gathered secondary data from the case and 
primary interviews with informants revealed significant effects of such risks on 
expected demand and production. Even though the studied SC was not directly the 
target of sanctions, it has suffered significantly as a side effect. In fact we first 
performed a pre-study to identify potential SC risks in the studied case, which 
highlighted sanctions as the most important source of risks, when taking into 
consideration the probability and severity of impacts.  
Focus group sessions let us identify multiple instances of EPRs, and revealed their 
multi-dimensional nature. The main emphasis of those meetings was to gather deeper 
knowledge about how different types of risks occur, how they influence the business, 
what factors are important to consider while analyzing them, how supply chain partners 
have tried to manage such risks in the past, and what other mitigation efforts are being 
considered by the case companies. Based on the focus group meetings, we identified the 
scope of the SC that was at risk as an important dimension. Specifically, the flow of 
knowledge, finances, and material could be impacted by EPRs (Figure 3). Within each 
of these groups we identified additional types of impact that captured the key risk 
factors. We also found it useful to distinguish between short-term (less than one year) 
and long-term impacts. Whereas short-term impacts are typically seen to require urgent 
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fixes to avoid operational failures, the long-term risks change the strategic direction of a 
firm, e.g. in product choice, balancing innovation and production, export goals, and 
market segmentation. In practice, we found that most common elements of sanctions 
e.g. resolutions by the UN or EU, first impact financial flows, and then become 
significant impediments to material and knowledge flows, partly as a result of 
disruptions in financial flows.  
 
 
Figure 3- Classification of the econo-political risks based on time span, scope and types of risks 
 
Different types of risks are relevant within each impact scope. Material flows may be 
disrupted due to both part procurement and logistics effects. In the short run the 
logistics issues are the most salient, and include inspection, third party logistics (3PL) 
providers and transport company restrictions, and restrictions on foreign transport 
companies. For example, at the first sight a 2006 resolution banning the 
‘export/procurement of any arms and related material’ to the target country may sound 
irrelevant to the automotive industry; however, enforcing this ban has led to random 
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inspections of cargos destined to the target country. Shipments of automotive parts may 
fall under these inspections, leading to weeks of delays in shipment. Variations in 
inspection frequency and rigor create variations in risk across different source countries. 
Due to the language of the sanction laws or their interpretation by enforcing countries 
and entities, other restrictions may be imposed that prevent 3PL providers and transport 
companies of the target country from utilizing some routes and origins. Ultimately, 
restrictions on foreign 3PL and transport companies to perform shipment for companies 
of target country may be introduced leading to acute procurement challenges. While the 
stated banned parts may be limited to those with military usage, some automotive spare 
parts are suspected to have dual use. Such parts may include many generic parts, such as 
specific types of bolts and screws. Suppliers may supply these parts, but they should 
ensure their usage is in non-military applications, requiring primary and follow up 
checks on their usage in the production line of the buyer. Problems exacerbate over the 
longer term as suppliers of such parts may insist on terminating the contract or altering 
delivery commitments and pricing. The reduction in the number of willing suppliers 
also reduces the negotiating power of the buyer, leading to further costs. Consequently, 
the buyer should either pay more, seek alternative parts that are not dual-use, or modify 
the strategic direction of the products portfolio. 
EPRs impact financial flows through payment methods or bank transactions. Bank 
transactions central to trade, such as obtaining letters of credit, confirming credit, and 
executing money transfers, could all be impacted. Sanctions may target these bank 
transactions directly, for example financial institutions and banks of the target country 
may be banned from some transactions, or international financial institutions may 
refrain from working with such entities for fear of triggering sanction-related penalties. 
These factors usually kick in as the knowledge of sanctions and their potential risks for 
financial players become known internationally and new more restrictive processes and 
guidelines are developed by international partners of the target country. These 
limitations may force SC actors into cash transactions, which increases transaction 
costs, reduces flexibility, and lengthens transaction times. In fact, some trade partners 
may lack specific procedures to execute large cash transactions. As a result, not only do 
the direct transaction costs increase, but also SC members are forced to keep more 
inventories or face additional uncertainty in production. 
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The impact of EPRs on knowledge flow surfaces over longer time horizons and can 
influence the capability building in SC member companies. While the sanctions in our 
case do not target knowledge transfer to the target country, many countries and 
authorities interpret the ban on knowledge related to military and nuclear programme 
extensively to include licensing, technologies, and knowledge relevant to automotive 
SC. This can complicate the response efforts by the SC actors. For example in response 
to part shortages due to material flow disruption the manufacturer had attempted to 
develop local suppliers. However, this process was partly hampered by restrictions on 
licensing, trading equipment, and technology transfer. In addition, the SC had to slow 
its growth programme as it could not easily expand and alter its product portfolio due to 
the restraints on buying equipment, foreign investment and knowledge transfer. 
An additional finding from our case is that EPRs can trigger regulatory and public 
responses with a potentially significant impact on the SC. These secondary effects of 
EPRs are often varied and may include both challenges and opportunities. For example, 
a target country may change its regulations to adapt to some of the consequences of the 
sanctions, which may have positive and negative ramifications for the SC in question. In 
our case, the government’s concern about inflationary results of sanctions has increased 
the risk of imposed price controls on the automobiles produced in the country. 
However, the sanctions have held back the country from joining the World Trade 
Organisation and thus have kept high import tariffs on automobiles, thereby allowing 
domestic car manufacturers to survive international competition despite their 
inefficiencies. Moreover negative economic impacts of sanctions, and the risk of the 
extension of sanctions to gasoline imports, has increased the long term appeal of fuel 
efficient cars, changing the strategic demand outlook for the SC in question. Overall, 
whilst the net impacts of the secondary effects of EPRs are somewhat ambiguous, their 
extent can be significant, thus leading to major uncertainties for the SC actors and 
increasing the risks regarding long term investments. 
In contrast to natural risks, EPRs emerge slowly. Our case SC was exposed to low 
levels of these risks for over two decades yet grew at an annual rate of 20%. Economic 
stakeholders across political fault lines often resist the escalation of EPRs and may 
succeed in containing these risks. However, political developments can escalate the 
risks and lead to full-fledged EPRs, as has occurred since 2006 in our case. Once in 
place, the removal of these risks may be complex and partly dependent on their scale or 
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original cause. Political developments can de-escalate tensions that had led to the EPRs 
in the first place; however, this may not be enough for the reversal of EPRs. Once trade 
links are severed, many international players with stakes in maintaining the trade routes 
lose interest as they establish a new trade portfolio. Others may institute organisation-
level policies that block potential transactions with a target country. In the absence of 
pressure from these international players it may take a long time, even years, after the 
end of a political conflict before EPRs such as sanctions are completely resolved. 
4.2 Factors Moderating the Impact of EPRs 
While EPRs are not directly controlled by the firm, our interview findings pointed to 
exposure of a SC to international trade as the main moderator of the impact of EPRs on 
a SC. This moderator also highlights the strategic reorientation a SC may need to 
undertake in order to minimise the impact of EPRs. Product characteristics partially 
explain the exposure of a SC to international trade. The ease with which products, 
including spare parts and procured material, can be domestically produced reduces the 
potential impact of EPRs. In practice, different products in the portfolio are 
differentially exposed to international trade, and the increased probability of EPRs may 
shift the strategic focus of a company towards those products with lower exposure. In 
extreme cases, many items in the portfolio may become infeasible to produce, reducing 
the choice set for the SC and significantly hurting both profitability and robustness 
against other risks.  
The technologies used in the production process are also directly relevant to these 
considerations. Production processes that rely on imported manufacturing equipment or 
know-how are more exposed to EPRs. This risk extends to different suppliers of the SC, 
so in practice some of the more advanced and financially strong suppliers, who 
traversed the technological frontline before sanctions, become more at risk in the face of 
EPRs. In contrast, larger and financially stronger suppliers are more resilient to demand 
fluctuations and payment delays. Other characteristics of existing and alternative 
supplier networks also play a moderating role. Where a manufacturer has access to 
multiple alternative suppliers, especially ones that are not solely tied to it (and thus can 
more flexibly accommodate changes in demand), it is more resilient in the face of 
EPRs.  
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4.3 Response to the Risk: Planning and Implementation 
The response of SC members to EPRs varies depending on the actors’ perceptions of 
timing and scope of the risks. The impact of these risks unfolds gradually, potentially 
offering SC members time to plan and take precautionary actions and responses; yet SC 
members may still be caught by surprise. For example, one of the significant EPR-
related disruptions in our case dates back to December 2006, when a new UN resolution 
temporarily cut the supply of a critical part and shut down a major production line. SC 
decision makers were caught by surprise because over the previous decade they had 
seen several sanction laws with limited impact on the automotive industry. In response 
to this event a risk management team in the SC was created to focus on the analysis and 
planning for possible risks. 
However, EPRs are not easy to plan for and in fact we observed few proactive moves by 
the SC to prepare for these risks before they emerged. EPRs typically arise from the 
political sphere and are part of a complex game between different international players, 
and as a result many future steps are hard to predict. Even when sanctions are in place, 
they may not be enforced in one period, followed by overenthusiastic enforcement in 
the next period. In the face of these uncertainties we found that SC members were 
reluctant to take extreme actions and preferred to adjust their reaction to the actual level 
and persistence of a challenge. In fact some solutions require strategic reorientation and 
are only advantageous if the sanctions are persistent. We therefore, categorise the 
actions of SC companies in face of EPRs based on the decision making level, which 
also largely corresponds to the time horizon for a decision (See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4- Decision making levels 
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The most common operational response included finding alternative ways to complete a 
blocked transaction. In some cases the transport mode was changed from ship to air to 
avoid delays in the shipment of critical parts due to unexpected inspection delays. The 
SC also resorted to hiring more expensive international transport companies in the face 
of this risk. Finally, in a few instances financial transactions were moved to alternative 
institutions when the responsible bank in the target country was blocked from 
conducting international transactions.  
Once the immediate challenges were resolved, tactical moves were pursued to further 
mitigate the risks. We observed a few of these moves that occurred more frequently in 
our cases: transport routes were changed to avoid future inspection delays; intermediary 
companies in third countries were set up to handle the routing of the goods without 
triggering sanction related alarms; and financial transactions were increasingly handled 
based on debit, e.g. cash, and by full payment before the shipment of goods.  
At the strategic level we observed a few responses that the case SC relied upon, 
including localisation, altering of the product portfolio, incorporating low risk global 
suppliers, and altering suppliers’ share. Enlarging the domestic share of supply was an 
increasingly important strategy over the study period. This strategy was also advocated 
by the national government, which sought to address unemployment (partly attributable 
to sanctions) through increased domestic production of intermediate parts. A shift in the 
product portfolio was also pursued to accommodate products that are less reliant on an 
international SC. In our case the production plans for seven alternative car platforms 
could be changed to move production towards lower-priced products, which included 
fewer internationally sourced parts. Such shifts, however, are also bounded by demand 
for these products that is influenced by EPRs.  
Another strategic reorientation included efforts to replace or add alternative global 
suppliers with higher reliability in the face of sanctions. In practice this required shifting 
towards suppliers in East Asia. The downside of this shift was the lower quality in the 
procured parts compared to the original parts produced in Europe. In fact, a committee 
was formed to identify critical parts and potential suppliers, and to negotiate flexible 
contracts with them that allowed the SC to quickly shift to these alternatives in the face 
of new disruptions.  
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Consider a concrete example: in 2010 the higher management of the manufacturing 
company, recognising the gravity of the EPRs, significantly lowered its expected 
demand and thus the production plans for the upcoming years across all the production 
lines, as illustrated in Figure 5. The new plans reflected the confluence of multiple 
factors: the general decline in buying power of the population was expected to reduce 
the demand and shift it to the cheaper product segments; and production costs were 
expected to rise significantly across the board with a larger impact on the higher end 
products that relied on part imports. In fact, the feasibility of high volume production 
was questionable for some high-end segments and domestic sourcing was put forward 
as a strategic priority. These factors contradicted the original strategic plan to cut down 
production on SM1 and SM2 entry segments and move towards high-end segments. 
Another conflating factor was the expected government budget deficit, partially due to 
sanctions, which was anticipated to cut back on the decade-long ‘cash-for-clunkers’ 
programme that had assisted low income individuals in buying entry level cars (SM1 
and SM2 segments). Finally, while reducing the expected innovation rate in the high-
end segments, the management increased the share of dual fuel models, cars able to 
burn both natural gas and gasoline, across the board, to address risk of gasoline shortage 
due to sanctions.  
 
Figure 5- Changes in predicted demand and production plan for the five year horizon following the 
accumulation of EPR-related strategic considerations in 2010. Dollar values for product segments 
are based on 2010 exchange rates, which changed significantly over the 2011-2012 period. 
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The implementation of these changes could be complex. Our informants agreed that 
smaller companies often lack the expertise, connections, and financial slack required for 
implementing some of these changes, especially those at the strategic level. As a result, 
they may try to use operational shortcuts, such as using incompatible parts, thereby 
leading to significant quality problems downstream. Inability to cope with these risks 
has also lead to the bankruptcy of many smaller suppliers. In fact this effect is 
increasingly reducing the options for domestic sourcing of the parts, reducing the long-
term viability of the strategy that was originally favoured by the SC players.  
4.4 Integrating Risks, Responses, and Downstream Effects  
Results of the group sessions, individual interviews and reviewed documents were 
integrated to develop a qualitative model of hypothesised causal pathways through 
which EPRs impact the SC. These pathways are discussed in the text and a summary 
influence diagram (Sterman 2000) is available in Appendix D. Specific EPRs and the 
responses taken by the SC in each case have been discussed above, yet several 
downstream effects require further elaboration. In many instances responses that helped 
alleviate the EPRs entailed some costs and side effects, which were important in our 
case. Quality was hurt when sourcing was shifted to domestic suppliers or those with 
more lenient policies regarding the enforcement of sanctions. Contracting 
intermediaries, using cash payments, changing transport routes, and working with 
international banks, all increased the lead time in part procurement and elevated 
production disruption risks while also incurring additional inventory costs. Contracting 
intermediaries and international transport and 3PL companies, changing transport routes 
and modes, as well as cash payments also increased the overall import costs, thereby 
damaging the financial viability of both the suppliers and the manufacturer.  
Poor or incorrect parts, due to single sourcing, domestic, or low quality replacement 
suppliers, increased the production disruptions, as did increased part lead time and 
supplier bankruptcy, which was becoming increasingly frequent. Investment and 
maintenance costs were also increased when restrictions on foreign investment, 
knowledge transfer, and equipment import were put in place. Lower quality, production 
uncertainty, and increased costs all significantly hurt the financial health of the 
manufacturer.  
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Several secondary effects of the sanctions were also notable. In addition to the direct 
impact of the sanctions on the studied SC, they have also had a broad influence on the 
business environment. For instance, sanctions in the country of this case have resulted 
in a significant limitation on fuel imports. Domestic petrol producers have limited their 
production capacity and the country is highly dependent on the import of fuel. 
Designers of sanctions tried to persuade the target country to accept their conditions 
through imposing a severe prohibition on fuel trade. This restriction has led to a rise in 
the fuel price in the national market and a shift in demand towards more efficient cars. 
This was exacerbated by an overall economic downturn, partially induced by the 
sanctions, which further reduced overall demand. These shifts, along with barriers to 
imports and exports and the loss of research and development growth, have forced the 
manufacturer to downgrade the product portfolio towards cheaper and more 
domestically supplied products. This has reduced the profit margin and overall revenue, 
further hurting the bottom-line.  
A further impact of the sanctions on the business environment can be observed when 
considering their impact on broader economy. The studied SC is located in a country 
with oil resources. Oil export plays a crucial role in balancing the economy of this 
country. Sanctions induced restrictions on the export of oil, a reduction in oil revenues, 
and consequently an increase of the exchange rate, thus increasing the costs of imported 
parts further and cutting the government’s revenue. The latter effect reduced the 
availability of government loans for the SC actors. In the absence of these loans, and 
faced with a manufacturer who was financially in trouble and thus late with payments, 
some suppliers went bankrupt, putting further pressure on the manufacturer in a vicious 
cycle.  
We also noted that EPRs could indirectly challenge the application of rational decision 
making processes in the SC, thereby weakening the SC’s ability to cope with these 
risks. For example, in response to the sanctions the national government resorted to 
different measures, these ranged from a denial of the risks (in order to keep domestic 
support for contentious international policies) to the censorship of news related to the 
impact of these risks, and manipulation of the currency markets. These measures 
increased uncertainty and reduced the clarity of communication and openness of 
planning processes among the larger members of the SC. In fact, with many 
dependencies on the government, a manufacturer could be forced into taking actions 
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motivated by political considerations rather than the financial interests of the 
shareholders. In the longer-term, the declining business environment persuaded many 
talented human resources to emigrate from the country, further eroding the capability of 
SC to manage the risks and mount viable response. These indirect challenges to 
functional decision making were increasingly significant with the escalation of EPRs. It 
is plausible that SC members also put pressure on the political decision makers to take 
steps towards reducing the EPRs; however, our research did not provide opportunities to 
document these potential balancing effects.  
4.5 Overall Impact of Econo-Political Risks  
Precise evaluation of the impacts of these causal mechanisms on the SC in question is 
complex and requires data beyond that available in our case study; however, we can 
offer some basic observations. Due to international political dynamics the EPRs were 
ramped up over the 2006-2011 period in our case. Initially, the fixes applied by the SC 
members were sufficient to mitigate these risks and the financial impacts were rather 
limited. After an initial surprise the SC members became adept in identifying the risks 
and ways to go around them. However, in the latter half of the period the long term 
impacts and the side effects of initial fixes started to kick in, while the scope of 
sanctions continuously expanded. At this point the SC became trapped between 
restrictions on the flow of material, money, and knowledge, and the macro-economic 
and demand side effects of sanctions. Thus the EPRs started to take a significant toll on 
the SC despite the different contingency planning that had been undertaken. In fact, if it 
was not for the high tariffs imposed on automobile imports to support domestic 
production, the whole industry could have gone bankrupt in competition against 
international players. 
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this research we have used a case study of a SC in a country under sanctions to 
enhance our understanding of EPRs to SCs and how a SC reacts to such risks. The 
theory we have developed highlights the different pathways through which these risks 
influence a SC and the different solutions SC members employ to mitigate the risks. We 
found it helpful to organise the types of risks based on the time frame during which they 
unfold and the scope and types of activities they target. Furthermore, we organised 
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potential risk reactions in terms of the implementation time horizon and the level of 
decision makers within an organisation that they involve.  
Overall, EPRs are somewhat unique in that they are slow moving, may change in 
response to the reactions of SC members, and may influence a large number of SCs 
regardless of the industry and even geographic proximity. Once exposed to such risks 
SC members may have to move slowly in their responses because all solutions are 
costly and changes in the political atmosphere may alter or remove the risk before a 
long-term solution can be implemented. Once established, however, these risks are 
persistent and significantly erode the profitability of SC members. Most affected are the 
small suppliers at the bottom of the chain who lack the financial resources, the network 
and expertise, and the political connections needed to manoeuvre around these risks.  
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
Our paper distinguishes EPRs as a major category of risks to SCs not previously 
studied. EPRs affect different aspects of SC operations. Results of the analysis suggest 
classification of these impacts based on their scope (material, financial and knowledge 
flow) and time span (short-term and long-term). Material and financial flow are 
immediately influenced by EPRs, while the impact on knowledge flow can mainly be 
captured when SC operations are investigated from a long-term perspective. The 
magnitude of these impacts can vary significantly based on the focus of the EPRs and 
according to their importance within different industries. For the companies similar to 
the studied case in this research, a high level of international connections and 
dependency is a liability that exposes the chain to EPRs.    
Unlike most SC risks, EPRs emerge slowly. Over two decades of exposure to some 
sanctions had limited impact on the firms we studied, potentially making them less 
sensitive to increasing risks as new sanctions were put into effect from 2006 onward. 
Once these new sanctions were in place the firms started to undergo a large number of 
changes in response to, or as a result of, these sanctions. Furthermore, EPRs long-term 
impacts are mainly related to restrictions on knowledge and technology accumulation, 
which limit the growth of a business and its strategic position in the global market. 
Sanctions also indirectly influence SCs through changing the business environment. In 
our case country the increase of fuel price, significant fluctuations and a sharp increase 
in exchange rates, and the reduction of oil exports and consequently lower oil revenue 
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for the government, were among the key general effects of sanctions that radically 
changed the business environment. These indirect effects are a major part of how EPRs 
influence SCs.    
Reaction of supply chain members to EPRs is changing through the time from the start 
of the threats. This paper categorizes reactions/mitigation strategies into operational, 
tactical and strategic levels. SC members initially react to these risks by trying to 
circumvent the threats and then by changing their strategic direction to reduce exposure 
to these risks. When sanctions were first imposed SC members employed operational 
and temporary solutions. Once they suspected that the sanctions would be in place for a 
long time then strategic changes were adopted.    
The presented framework and theoretical structure will allow researchers encountering a 
new problem to better articulate the scope, timeline, and type of risks as well as the mix 
of responses the SC members may draw upon. They can also use the proposed causal 
mechanisms to trace potential processes that may be operational in a new setting, to 
conduct quantitative risk assessment, and project future scenarios.  
Our research underlines the interdependency of EPRs. Whereas SCRM literature often 
focuses on a specific risk and how to manage it, we find that EPRs are interlinked, 
emerge in parallel, and their solutions are also interacting. This calls for more holistic 
modelling and analysis in the evaluation of EPRs and their impact. We also observe the 
propagation of risks across members of a SC to those not directly exposed to EPRs, a 
finding that may apply to other types of risks as well (Wu, Blackhurst et al. 2007). A 
new dimension of risk propagation that we find to be important is when a SC is exposed 
to economic and regulatory risks that are secondary effects of the original EPRs. 
Two novel characteristics of this research complement its contribution to the SCRM 
literature. First, the majority of SCRM research focuses on the pre-event phase of the 
risk management cycle but this research focuses on the post-event effects and reactions, 
including both short and long term dynamics. Second, the majority of empirical 
research on SC risks and disruption are based on data from developed countries, 
whereas a growing share of global production and trade belongs to SCs that involve 
developing countries. Research in these settings is impeded by data availability and 
access to stakeholders, yet new insights regarding how real SCs in developing countries 
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work, what their common challenges are, and how they could be improved would make 
such research worthwhile.  
5.2 Practical Implications 
Besides elaborating on the basic concept of EPRs and their implications, this paper has 
potential ramifications for different players. Members of SCs in countries with a high 
risk of sanctions can learn to navigate this risk by knowing about potential solutions 
they can include in their response portfolio. These include actions such as re-routing the 
transport path, employing intermediary companies, and having a supplier contingency 
plan. The usefulness of these actions depends on the type of threat and its persistence. 
The research also provides insights for market players who may want to turn EPRs into 
commercial opportunities, as SCs in sanctioned countries are seeking international 
partners to soften the impact of such restrictions. By understanding the causal 
mechanisms that regulate the impact of EPRs, potential external partners may identify 
unique business opportunities sought by SCs exposed to EPRs. 
This research can also inform the design of smarter sanctions as the focus of this article 
is on SCs that are not directly the target of sanctions. In our case and during the time 
period of this study, none of the sanctions imposed on the case country were supposed 
to be targeting the SC in question. However, in practice they significantly influenced the 
SC leading to the bankruptcy of a sizeable number of smaller private suppliers, and in 
balance resulted in much collateral damage. Helping understand the hidden costs of 
sanctions is important in evaluating and designing sanctions. In fact, one of the main 
debates within sanctions literature is how to improve the effectiveness of sanctions 
(Eyler, 2007). The primary reason for sanctions is to force countries to change their 
behaviour by causing commercial barriers and financial problems for governments. 
However, if sanctions weaken the private sector (which is often in competition with the 
governmental sector, especially in developing countries), they may actually increase the 
relative power of a government, thus reducing the effectiveness of the sanctions. The 
insights of this research help to distinguish between planned impacts and side-effects of 
sanctions. Moreover, the larger SC players in most cases succeeded in circumventing 
the sanctions, albeit with high costs. This may suggest that the official targets for 
sanctions (e.g. governmental military programmes) with their financial resources and 
lack of profitability considerations are even more likely to succeed in evading sanctions. 
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To work towards their intended goals, sanctions need to be designed with an eye on the 
exact players and work processes they influence. Our research provides a rare entry into 
mapping these influence pathways. 
5.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
This research only begins to provide a theory on econo-political SC risks and much 
research can build on this early step. We focused on sanctions as an example, but this 
category of risks could be further expanded to include political instability, civil unrest, 
and other related areas of EPRs. More case studies could expand the portfolio of risks 
and responses, and further develop the relevant causal pathways. For example our 
limited data did not allow us to explicitly include the impact of sanctions on human 
resource flows of the firm; yet that may prove an important forth scope to be considered 
in how EPRs impact SCs. 
Another limitation of this study is its reliance on qualitative data. While this type of data 
provides us with insights to propose a set of causal mechanisms that theorise on EPRs 
and their impact, we do not quantitatively assess these mechanisms. Empirical studies 
are needed to establish the magnitude of different risks and pathways and the 
effectiveness of different responses. Data availability is a major challenge to conduct 
such research due to less developed data collection processes in cases where EPRs are 
already present, and access challenges in the face of political sensitivities. 
The time and costs associated with implementing each response should also be assessed 
and could be the target for analytical research. For example, operational research 
models could be developed to address optimum sourcing plans under different EPR 
portfolios. In coping with EPRs, manufacturing and 4PL members of our case SC where 
interested in analysing questions such as: when is the introduction of alternative 
suppliers cost effective? What should be the share of each supplier? What contractual 
arrangements best balance the risks and costs when exposed to EPRs and provide 
enough incentives for suppliers to continue working with the SC?  
Finally, dynamic games between sanctioning countries and the sanctioned industries 
could also be developed from either perspective. Game theory can be used as a tool to 
help sanctioning countries to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts, and can also be 
investigated from the sanctioned country’s perspective to let companies compare 
solutions and devise better options to reduce the expected cost of potential risks. 
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Overall, we hope this paper provides an entry into an important but largely unexplored 
research area and inspires others to explore different aspects of EPRs to SCs. 
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Appendix A – Interview Guide (Translated into English) 
Interviewees received these questions as well as a brief description on goals of the 
interview meeting before each session.  
 
Primary interview (to define general directions of the research) 
Interviewee: --------- Company name: --------- Title in the company: --------- 
- What are the main risks in your company which can disrupt the operations of the 
chain? (Please exclude operational risks)  
- What are the sources of main risks? 
- According to your experience, how frequent those risks can happen? 
- What is the potential loss they can make? 
- Please describe those risks in more details. What happens to supply chain 
operations when those risks occur?  
 
Individual interview 
Interviewee: --------- Company name: --------- Title in the company: --------- 
- Does the company consider risks originated from sanctions as significant? 
Why/why not? 
- What are the risks which are originated from sanctions? 
- What are the responses the company has taken to these risks? 
- Which aspects of business are influenced by sanctions? 
- How sanctions influence supply chain operations? 
- How do you evaluate the impacts of risks caused by sanctions? 
 
Focus group sessions 
Participants: --------- Company name: --------- Titles in the company: --------- 
- How each of the econo-political risks occurs in supply chain? 
- What challenges do you face due to each risk? 
- How do you fight against those challenges? 
- Do you see any difficulties which can be triggered by taken reactions?  
- How your company and also local members of the chain are influenced by those 
risk and reactions? 
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- Do you see any specific factor which has a significant role on how risks can 
influence your chain’s operations? 
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Appendix B - Analysis Process 
Data collection started by developing a primary conceptual framework based upon the 
literature and open interviews with three top managers of the studied cases. The first 
phase of data collection used individual interviews to learn about the companies, the 
type of EPRs they face and the resulting losses in previous years. Preliminary analysis 
sharpened the questions for follow up interviews and focus group sessions during the 
second phase of data collection. The main purpose of these meetings was to compare 
and aggregate the knowledge of different informants, leading to an increasingly detailed 
representation of relevant causal mechanisms. Data from each session was synthesised 
with previous findings using causal relationship diagrams and summary tables.  
Besides building on the individual interviews we utilised the group sessions in 
developing these causal diagrams. Before each group session participants were provided 
with a short document describing the core topics of discussion and definitions for key 
terms used within the group sessions. Different risks were identified before the sessions, 
yet participants were also able to modify and extend these risks within the session. 
Earlier group sessions focused on identifying the challenges that emerged as a result of 
EPRs. Discussions started with open-ended questions on how each risk occurs and how 
it influences SC operations. The first author facilitated the sessions, capturing the 
emerging themes on a board, asking probing questions to establish causal mechanisms, 
and helping to keep the discussion focused. Later sessions followed a similar structure 
but focused on solutions and downstream impacts to discover what outcomes each 
solution has contributed to. These discussions were largely informed by the direct 
experience of participants, but in a few instances hypothetical scenarios were explored 
to predict potential downstream outcomes which had not yet materialised. 
The resulting summary figures and tables were then shared with participants to collect 
feedback and elaborations. The analysis was finalised in the third step in which the 
unfolding of new risks and company reactions were monitored through follow ups and 
company reports. Further triangulation was attempted through direct observation and 
monitoring of the sourcing decisions in practice. 
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Appendix C – Building confidence in the results 
 
Different actions were taken to ensure the quality and rigor of this research. Early-on a 
case study protocol was developed that guided the different steps of the research and 
helped with organising the research trajectory (Yin, 2003). Construct validity was 
partially addressed by engaging four case informants to review the intermediate 
progress reports and to provide feedback on the accuracy of the interpretations (Yin, 
2003; Seuring, 2008). Furthermore, drawing on multiple sources of data helped with 
triangulation between different types of evidence and provided some external validity 
(Silverman, 2000). The research process employed a combination of process guides to 
enhance accuracy (Silverman, 2000): the first author conducted the observations and 
took short notes, expanding upon them afterwards to develop a body of evidence based 
on direct observation; a field work journal was kept to prevent forgetting critical days, 
specific people who were met and the data collected; consulting the relevant literature 
provided additional guidance in the research process; and finally, multiple criteria for 
assessing the trustworthiness in qualitative research (Mollenkopf et al., 2007, Lin and 
Zhou, 2011) were used to build confidence in the research process at different steps. 
These considerations are summarized in Table A. 
 
Table A- Criteria to ensure trustworthiness of the study and findings 
Criteria Employed methods in this study 
Credibility 
Results are be acceptable 
representations of the data 
Research protocol was prepared in early stages of the work. 
Connection between research questions and required data to gather was 
defined in research design. 
Case study report was written based on a pre-defined. 
One experienced academic researcher and informant in the case company 
gave input to researchers all the way during research process 
The initial interpretations of the data were checked with interviewees in the 
companies 
Finalized interpretations of data were checked with key contacts in the case 
companies 
The emergent framework and propositions were expanded and altered 
several times to match the data in the best way 
Dependability 
Explanations are stable or 
consistent; findings are not 
unique to time and place 
The study has been done during four years to investigate the case companies 
through the time. 
The interviewees were selected among experienced managers who have been 
completely familiar with past and present status of the companies. 
Regardless of the time and specific characteristics of sourcing methods in 
investigated companies, narrated stories of risk were consistent. 
Confirmability 
Interpretations are the result of 
the participants and the 
phenomenon and are not 
Interpretations, preliminary findings and analysis were independently 
reviewed by all the researchers. 
Provisional interpretations were reported to key informants of the case 
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Criteria Employed methods in this study 
biased to researchers’ ideas companies through the process of research. 
Integrity 
Interpretations are not 
influenced by misinformation 
or evasions by participants 
The interviews and focus group sessions were completely friendly and 
anonymity of interviewees are kept in all reports.  
The participants were willing to contribute because the focus of the work 
was their daily issue and an important aspect to consider in their business. 
One interviewee evaded from answering some of the questions, the 
interpretation of gathered data from him was checked with other informants 
in the company. 
Fit 
Findings fit with the 
substantive area under 
investigation 
Final analysis was reviewed by four external experts in the area.  
This criterion was also addressed based on the methods mentioned in 
credibility, dependability and confirmability criteria. 
The emergent results are describing the investigated area deeply and 
completely based on the experienced events in the studied cases. 
Understanding 
Participants accepts the results 
as representations of the 
reality 
At the end of each interview and focus group meeting, participants were 
asked to either confirm or correct the interpretations of researchers. 
After each interview and focus group meeting, an extended report was sent 
to participants to make sure about the correctness of interpretations. 
Periodic reports were sent to key informants of each stage of the work to get 
their confirmation. 
Final report was reviewed and confirmed by one of the key members in the 
studied case. 
Generality 
Findings discover multiple 
aspects of the phenomenon 
Semi-structured and open-ended interviews and focus group sessions let 
participants to consider multiple aspects in the area. 
Informants from different departments were interviewed to capture different 
aspects of the investigated phenomenon. 
The study has been done during a long period of time which let researchers 
to grasp multiple insights through the time not only from interviewees but 
also the documents in the companies. 
Control 
Organizations can influence 
aspects of the theory 
Some aspects of the studied concept can be controlled by investigated 
companies, e.g. SC mitigation strategies and decision making process in case 
of occurrence of risky events. 
Sources of criteria: adapted from (Mollenkopf et al., 2007, Lin and Zhou, 2011) 
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Appendix D – Cause and effect diagram for EPRs’ impact, SC response, and downstream effects 
  
EPRs are highlighted in Italic Bold font (brown), EPR motivated exogenous impacts in italics (black), SC responses underlined (blue), and effects observed in the SC in 
smaller font (green). 
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